The approach of linking funding to progress toward an AP mine
ban was not unanimously accepted.
The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which operated humanitariandemining teams in LTTE-controlled
areas, expressed that the pressure
placed on parties involved in the
conflict to make mine-ban commitments amounted to “politicization”
of mine-action funding, and that it
led to very short-term funding and
was problematic for agencies carrying out the work.26
During the early years of the
cease-fire, there were a number of
national and international actors involved in attempts to convince the
parties to move toward a ban on the
use of AP mines. However, progress
was limited; the government linked
accession to the AP Mine Ban Convention to reaching an agreement
with the LTTE over the “non-use”
of landmines, while the LTTE made
it clear that they would only consider banning the weapon if significant
progress toward peace was made.5
As the conflict escalated, the opportunities and prospects for advocacy were reduced. There was
increasing hostility to any initiative
that seemingly limited the means
and methods of warfare. Geneva
Call, which had been engaging the
LTTE in a ban on landmines with
the endorsement of the Sri Lankan
government,27 was soon no longer
granted permission by the government
to visit LTTE-controlled areas to proceed with this engagement.28 Later, the
organization was informed by the
government that it would not even
be granted the necessary permission
to enter the country. The Sri Lanka
Campaign to Ban Landmines was
basically inactive by 2006. Similarly,
the Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum
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ceased to function toward the end
of 2007. It is noteworthy that advocacy seems to have diminished at
the same time that allegations of renewed mine use were surfacing.
A general increase in hostility toward NGOs also affected agencies
involved in mine action. In 2006,
mine-clearance agencies operating in LTTE-controlled areas were
criticized for cooperating with the
Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation
at a time when the LTTE was carrying out attacks with commanddetonated “claymore” devices.29 It
is notable that despite the presence
of mine-action agencies in LTTEcontrolled areas—including at that
time the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which was working under the coordination of the National
Steering Committee for Mine Action—
there was no public clarification by
government officials of the important humanitarian role played by the
mine-clearance agencies.
Conclusion

The escalation of conflict in Sri
Lanka profoundly affected mine action. Some of the challenges were
predictable, though others could not
have been foreseen. To ensure that
they remain effective, mine-action
agencies and donors working in the
context of ongoing conflict must be
able to carefully monitor and assess
developments, and respond quickly
and appropriately to new challenges
as, and when, they emerge. Similarly, affected states must ensure that,
even in the midst of conflict, they
strive to cultivate an environment
conducive to mine action. However, since the collapse of the LTTE in
May 2009, recent efforts have been
made to improve mine action. Organizations including UNICEF, U.N.

feature | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2009 | 13.3

Development Programme, Mines
Advisory Group and Handicap International are conducting mine action in Sri Lanka, with numerous
other projects taking place.30
See Endnotes, Page 77
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A boy looks at an NCBL brochure during a mine-risk education class conducted by NCBL in Bardiya district, Nepal.
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Mine-risk Education in Nepal, 2009
Despite the signing of a 2006 peace agreement by the Nepalese government and the
Maoists, Nepal’s mine clearance remains a work in progress due to the after-effects
of its decade-long Maoist conflict and the emergence of small, armed groups. Ban
Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL) is at the forefront of the country’s mine-riskeducation efforts. This article examines NCBL’s MRE program objectives, expectations, methods, and achievements, as well as the many challenges it faces.
by Purna Shova Chitrakar [ Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal ]

T

he Unified Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) and the government of Nepal signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 21 November
2006. The tireless efforts of NCBL enabled
both parties to agree to incorporate important points on landmines and improvised
explosive devices into the CPA. The provi-

sion directs the parties to map landmines
and other explosive devices within 30 days
of the signing of the agreement and destroy
such mines and devices within 60 days. Despite this commitment, only 17 out of 53
minefields, and 99 out of more than 285
improvised-explosive-device fields were
cleared by mid-2009.
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No progress has been made on collecting the data
and destroying the mines and IEDs planted by the
Maoists. The mines and IEDs from the conflict continue
to injure, maim and kill the civilian population. Furthermore, the Maoist breakaway factions and the emerging
armed groups in the Terai (the stretch of foothills at the
base of the Himalayas) exacerbated the situation with
their use of explosives, resulting in 182 incidents within
28 districts in 2008. That year, media reports and information available to NCBL indicated 330 civilians were
injured in Nepal, which included 240 men, 46 women
and 44 children. Eighteen people died from their injuries. From January to June 2009, there were 96 civilian
victims: 46 men, 25 women and 25 children. Among
them, 11 died.1
When the CPA was signed, elections for the Nepalese Constituent Assembly were held. A functioning
interim government formed, and the top leader of the
Communist Party of Nepal became the prime minister.
However, the government has yet to encourage development and provide stability within the country. The
decade-long armed conflict encouraged various groups,
divided by caste, race and language, to continue fighting. Small, armed groups have emerged in the Terai and
hills of Nepal, fueling violence and further destabilizing the region.
NCBL MRE Program

Despite the challenging political situation, from January to March 2009, NCBL conducted mine-risk education in 10 districts in the hills and Terai with the
objective of protecting people’s lives and property from
mines and other explosives. NCBL also ran emergency
MRE in two additional districts, including Bardiya and
Rautahat, which suffered losses from explosions of mines
and other explosive remnants of war. The districts were
selected based on the number of explosions and casualties within each district. Ten facilitators were selected to
run the MRE program, and the International Committee
of the Red Cross, NCBL, Nepal Army and UNICEF implemented the introductory training. In addition, NCBL
published a brochure and distributed 100,000 copies of
MRE literature during the introductory program. NCBL
started providing MRE in 2003 and has conducted education programs in 39 districts.
Objectives of the MRE program included the following:
• Conduct and encourage community MRE while
raising awareness about the risks of mines
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• Conduct MRE in schools and motivate pupils to share
their knowledge with their families and communities
• Encourage security forces, local government and
relevant authorities to conduct MRE around security posts and high-risk areas to protect civilians
• Publish and distribute MRE materials
NCBL expected the following from the MRE program in 2009:
• Civilians from 10 districts would participate in MRE
• Fifty thousand civilians (including schoolchildren
and teachers) from 12 districts would receive MRE
• NCBL’s published materials would reach 50,000 local people
• The government and security forces would be encouraged to conduct MRE
NCBL had planned to run MRE in 10 districts, but
it added the Rautahat and Bardiya districts, as they had
substantial mine-contamination threats for the residents.
Altogether, 32,831 people, including teachers, students,
farmers, security personnel, journalists and intellectuals,
participated in and benefited from the program.
NCBL applied various learning techniques to civilians within these districts. Methods of mine-risk education included:
• Lectures
• Group discussions
• Door-to-door visits
• Media mobilization: local, regional, and national
print and broadcast media
• Discussions about MRE pictures
• Question-and-answer sessions
• MRE charts
• Speeches by teachers
Program Achievements

NCBL’s MRE program accomplished several objectives,
grouped into six categories of achievement, explained below.
Success in numbers. An overwhelming 32,911 students
and teachers in 160 schools and 40 communities in 12 districts benefited from the MRE program, namely Banke,
Bardia, Dang, Doti, Jajarkot, Panchthar, Parsa, Ramechhap,
Rautahat, Saptari, Siraha and Sunsari. The program taught
MRE participants to recognize and not tamper with suspicious objects, avoid suspected hazardous areas and inform
the authorities about possible minefields.
Cooperation. The MRE program was a joint effort
between the Nepal Army, International Committee of
the Red Cross, and UNICEF, social workers, journalists,

Students participate in an NCBL MRE class in Bardiya district, Nepal.

human-rights activists, students, teachers, members of
school-management committees and rural women from
different districts.
Political pressure. The MRE program put pressure
on the government to remove mines and to sign the
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention.
Keeping at-risk youths safe. The Maoists engaged children and youths in war and in the making of explosives. Even after the guns fell silent,
the children and youths maintained an interest in
bombs. The MRE program sensitized the youths to
the risks associated with mines and other explosive devices.
Expanded influence. The MRE program strengthened the anti-mine campaign and expanded the network of NCBL.
Community involvement. The program received
suggestions from the local community, teachers and
students on conducting and improving MRE. Additional achievements included:
• Conducted MRE in two additional districts.
• Distributed more than 100,000 copies of previously printed publications.

• Expanded NCBL’s impact and outreach in additional districts.
• Established the ability to organize an efficient response to landmine/ERW incidents affecting the
Madhesi people. In this case, NCBL organized a
rally of 150 women, eliciting a positive reaction
from the local community.
Monitoring and Evaluation Meeting

A monitoring and evaluation meeting was organized
to assess the work carried out by the facilitators in the
different districts. They discussed the following agenda
items during the meeting:
• Objectives, methodologies and achievements
• Experiences from the different districts
• Further difficulties in carrying out MRE
Suggestions. Various suggestions were received during the evaluation. NCBL believes these suggestions will
be helpful in planning and implementing future MRE:
• Organize district-level seminars. Such seminars
would support the mobilization of the districtlevel government agencies, political parties and
the media.
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• Include MRE within the school
curriculum. Notices posted on
school premises and in public
places could make people more
aware of the program’s availability. Interactive programs,
such as street dramas, quiz contests and essay competitions,
would bring greater attention
to MRE programs.
• Accelerate the campaign for declaring schools “zones of peace.”
• Ensure MRE is incorporated
into military and police training.
• Distribute MRE materials to a
wider population. Additionally, these materials should
be published in the various
languages represented by the
districts and should more accurately depict and represent
the local population.
• Increase government funding
to MRE programs.
• Incorporate information about
common consumer goods used
to make explosive devices into
the MRE programs.
• Promote MRE in children’s
magazines. Additional information could be effective in
reaching small children.
• Promote MRE on radio and
TV stations.
• Arrange for the facilitators to
meet with the cadres of the
emerging armed groups such
as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti
Morcha (Terai People’s Liberation Front)–Goit and Jwala Singh
factions, Madhesi Mukti Tigers,
Madhesi Virus Killer, Terai Jana
Kranti Parishad and others.
• Create and hang wall calendars. Calendars, with their
many pages, dates, events and
holidays, would be effective as
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they can be hung on the walls
of school buildings where students can see the educational
message year round.

The Rapid Response to
Operation Cast Lead

Difficulties

Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal
faces numerous challenges in carrying out its MRE programs. For instance, an incident occurred while
NCBL was on its way to Pakari in the
Saptari district to conduct MRE. The
Tigers questioned NCBL, suspecting
them of propagating fear among the
population. NCBL was able to carry
through with MRE, but an armed
sentry watched over the sessions at
all times. Conflict erupted in the Terai districts, further exacerbating the
situation as armed groups continually kept an eye on MRE program facilitators, inspecting the resource
materials for possible propaganda
against the armed groups.
Strikes, highway blockades and
arson continue to create obstacles
for NCBL facilitators. Furthermore,
limited resources remain a problem.
Conclusion

NCBL constantly faces obstacles to its MRE programs in Nepal.
Mines continue to injure, maim,
and kill men, women and children
in the rural areas. The emergence
of various armed groups in the Terai has further necessitated conducting MRE, and it has become
essential for the government to
sign the AP Mine Ban Convention
and to ensure assistance is provided to mine victims. Furthermore,
engagement in MRE and various
peace-building processes has become imperative in order to restore
lasting peace in Nepal.
See Endnotes, Page 78
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When the United Nations Mine Action Service was asked to assess the need for a
mine-action presence in the Gaza Strip following Operation Cast Lead, a 23-day conflict involving the Israeli Defence Forces and Palestinian militias in 2008, it was thrust
into one of the world’s most complicated humanitarian operating environments. This
article provides a background for the mine-action program in Gaza, summarizing the
key challenges and lessons learned during the first four months of operations in this
complex environment.

by Elena Rice [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]

B

etween 27 December 2008, and 18 January 2009, the Israel Defence Forces conducted Operation Cast Lead, a military
campaign with the objective of preventing Palestinian militants from firing homemade rockets
into Israeli territory. The campaign caused severe damage to infrastructure, including roads,
government offices, nongovernmental organizations, U.N. facilities, schools, hospitals and agricultural land. Following the Israeli withdrawal,
the United Nations Mine Action Service—at the
request of the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and in coordination with the U.N. Mine
Action Team—agreed to initiate a Technical
Assessment Mission under the United Nations
Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid
Response. This team arrived in Gaza on 23 January 2009, with these objectives:
• Establish the level of unexplodedordnance contamination
• Determine what assistance UNMAT and
the international mine-action community could provide to the affected civilian population, the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the U.N. Country
Team and other humanitarian actors

Damage to a classroom in a Balgis al Yemen
school, one of the many buildings investigated by
the Technical Assessment team.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF MINE ACTION TEAM–GAZA

•

Facilitate the opening of humanitarian
corridors and the delivery of humanitarian aid in line with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 18601
It became clear to the Technical Assessment Mission team that in the days immedi-
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